This article examines the political transition in Iraq from the perspective of international law, which regards forcible democratic regime change as unlawful.
Introduction
While the US-led military intervention divided the international community, 1 the introduction of democracy in Iraq following the establishment of the military occupation was neither contested nor apparently controversial: a remarkable fact given that regime change was the stated political objective of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2 reflecting the determination of the Bush Administration both to target 'rogue' states and to spread democracy, with a particular focus on the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. 3 This article examines the political transition in Iraq from the perspective of international law, which regards forcible democratic regime change as unlawful. 4 The concern is to establish the extent to which the relevant Security Council resolutions, 1483 (2003) , 1511 (2003) , and 1546 (2004), necessary to give legal effect to the fact of regime change, may be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the political authority provided to the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations, and consequently a lawful exercise of that authority.
The article will argue that Security Council resolutions enjoy 'democratic' political legitimacy (and legality) to the extent that they are consistent with the constitutional framework provided by the UN Charter and wider international law, and that they accord with the practice of the Security Council in 'like' cases, or the Council is able to demonstrate sufficient justification for the exercise of political authority in the particular case. Given that the nature of the system of international law is deliberation, reason, and consensus, the question whether sufficient justification exists will be dependent on the extent to which the relevant measure can be justified in accordance with the principle of public reason. In the case of Iraq, there is no doubt that that situation fell within the scope of authority of the Security Council, and that the decisions enjoyed a high degree of procedural legitimacy, in the form of participatory deliberations in the Security Council. Moreover, the Security Council has consistently expressed its support for the introduction of democracy as a necessary element in the re-establishment of international peace and security following military intervention in a 'failed' or 'rogue' state. The endorsement by the Security Council of a particular system of government, involving the sharing of power between the main ethno-cultural groups and expression of support for the establishment of a 'federal, democratic, [and] pluralist' Iraq, is consistent with neither standards recognized in international law, nor the practice of the Security Council. Given that no reasons were provided for the endorsement of the system of government introduced under the authority of the occupying powers, this must raise serious questions concerning the political 1 legitimacy and legal effect of the relevant resolutions, which have contributed to the emergence of a democratic system in Iraq in which religious and ethnic identity are central to political debate. 5 The article first reviews the process of political transition in Iraq, examining the role of Security Council resolutions. It concludes that the process constituted a violation of the right of the Iraqi people to political self-determination, creating a conflict between the Security Council resolutions adopted under chapter VII and an international norm of jus cogens standing. Rejecting arguments that the resolutions should be regarded as void, or that they should command absolute deference, the article outlines a model of constitutional adjudication in cases of conflict between these 'higher' forms of obligation in accordance with a deliberative understanding of the nature of the system of international law.
Regime Change and Occupation Law
Democratic regime change did not provide the legal basis for the military intervention in Iraq, and the issue did not feature in Security Council debates leading up to the intervention. The legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom depended on a particular reading of Security Council resolutions 678 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1441 (2002): the 'material breach' of the disarmament obligations in resolution 687 revived the right to use military force provided in resolution 678. 6 The legal basis for the intervention is unrelated to the position concerning forcible democratic regime change in states subject to foreign military occupation. Article 43 of the regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land obliges an occupying power to respect 'unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country'. 7 The regulations represent the position under customary international law. 8 Article 43 cannot be regarded as a norm of jus cogens, given that exceptions to the proscription are recognized in the second paragraph of article 64 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The exceptions concern threats to the security of the occupying power, obstacles to the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention, including the protection of the civilian population, and/or the need to maintain the orderly government of the territory. The introduction of democracy in a state subject to military occupation cannot be reconciled with the language of article 43, or justified by the exceptions recognized in the Fourth Geneva Convention. In short, international law precludes the possibility of the forced democratization of occupied territories. 14 In the words of Adam Roberts, the resolution both insisted on the application of occupation law and 'proclaimed certain transformative objectives for the occupation'.
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Resolution 1483 (2003) affirmed the right of the Iraqi people to political self-determination, 16 and referred to the need to establish a 'representative government' that affords equal rights to all Iraqi citizens 'without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender'. 17 The establishment of a representative government requires the recognition of equal rights of political participation for all citizens;
18 it does not require the introduction of democratic government, and resolution 1483 (2003) makes no reference to the need to introduce democracy in Iraq. 19 The Security Council did express its support for the formation of an Iraqi interim administration, 20 and on 13 July 2003 the occupying powers constituted a Governing Council of Iraq, which was given a role advising the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). 21 The 25 A 'common objective' had been agreed within the United Nations for the establishment of a 'sovereign, democratic and independent Iraq' as quickly as possible. 26 Under a process announced on 15 November 2003, indirect elections would be held to a transitional national assembly, which would elect a government and act as a legislative body. The 15 November proposals did not survive the opposition of the majority Shia population, notably Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who demanded early direct elections. 27 A compromise emerged in the form of a new interim and transitional constitutional order, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). 28 The TAL was drafted by the Governing Council of Iraq, under the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority, with CPA Administrator Paul Bremer playing a key role in the process.
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The Transitional Administrative Law provided for the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Government from the end of the occupation until the establishment of an Iraqi Transitional Government, following elections in January 2005. 30 It put in place a system of government that provided for the sharing of power between the representatives of the majority Shia population and minority Sunni and Kurdish groups, 31 and recognized a right of self-government for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. 32 The Transitional Administrative Law also introduced a political process, involving elections to a Transitional National Assembly, which had responsibility for drafting the permanent constitution. The constitution would be approved in a general referendum, with elections for a permanent government (parliamentary) republic'. 44 It recognizes a continued right of self-government for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, 45 and also introduces the possibility of other self-governing regions emerging. 46 Central government enjoys exclusive powers in defined and limited areas, in relation for example to foreign, defence, finance, and customs policy. 47 In all other areas, powers will be devolved to the regions, although they may be shared with the federal government. 48 Ibid., art. 114. 47 Ibid., art. 108. 48 Ibid., art. 111. was a legitimate exercise of the political authority accorded to the Security Council under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 55 and consequently effective in purporting to give legal effect at the level of the international community to the fact of regime change.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (a body established by the Security Council) has observed that neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations conceives of the Security Council as 'legibus solutus (unbound by law)'. The Council was established by a treaty which provides a 'constitutional framework' within which it operates. It is 'thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations'. 56 Specifically for these purposes, the Charter requires that the Security Council, in discharging its duties, act in accordance with the 'Purposes and Principles' of the organization. 57 The purposes include the development of friendly relations among nations based on 'the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples'. 58 The expression is not defined in the Charter, although the principle underpins chapters XI and XII, concerning non-self-governing and international trust territories. Additionally, the preamble begins 'We the peoples of the United Nations', and concludes with 'our respective Governments'. The term 'peoples' may be applied to 'peoples organised as States'. 59 In Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed its position that the principle of selfdetermination of peoples is now clearly recognized as a 'right' of peoples: 'a right erga omnes'. 60 The right of peoples to self-determination is also recognized as a norm of jus cogens. 61 International Court confirmed the existence of the notion of jus cogens. 62 In his separate opinion, Judge ad hoc Dugard observed that the recognition by the Court of jus cogens, along with the notion of obligations erga omnes, 'affirms the normative hierarchy of international law '. 63 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is void if it conflicts with a norm of jus cogens, 64 defined as a 'norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted'. 65 The notion of jus cogens is not only concerned with the law of treaties, however, or the non-derogable rights of states, for example the proscription on the permanent subjugation of the High Seas areas to the sovereignty of individual states. 66 Those peremptory norms that are 'clearly accepted and recognized include the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination'. 67 In his separate opinion, Judge ad hoc Dugard observed that norms of jus cogens 'give legal form to the most fundamental policies or goals of the international community'. 68 Norms of jus cogens represent the established interests of the international legal community, 69 distinct from those of the 'sovereign' collective interests of the members of that community. 70 Those 'clearly accepted and recognized' norms of jus cogens reflect both the fundamental value to the system of international law of international peace and security, 71 and a constructed idea of international justice within the international legal community, seen, for example, in the adoption of the resolutions of the General Assembly which first de-legitimized and then declared unlawful the practice of colonialism as a violation of the right of peoples to self-determination. Supra note 63, at para. 10.
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Formal rights of political participation, i.e. those concerning the ability to 'constitute' the system of international law, are reserved for states, and, to a limited extent, international organizations, which together comprise the 'international legal community'. 
A Democratic Self-determination
The contemporary position in international law on the right of peoples to self-determination is expressed in article 1, common to the International Covenants: 'All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.' 73 The populations of sovereign and independent states enjoy (as 'peoples') the right to determine the system of government and administration, and the substantive nature of their political regime. 74 It is increasingly accepted that this 'internal' aspect of the right of peoples to self-determination 75 requires the introduction of some form of democratic government, 76 albeit recognizing '[that] there is no single model of democracy', and 'the necessity of due respect for sovereignty and the right of self-determination'.
77 Democracy in international law is not defined by a particular institutional arrangement. 78 A regime is democratic if it embodies within its institutions and mechanisms, including its electoral system, the twin principles of political equality and popular sovereignty. 79 Political equality requires that the votes and preferences of one citizen be accorded the same respect as those of all others. Popular sovereignty 'is the view that individual citizens bestow legitimacy upon a government through their implied or actual consent to its rule'. 80 The will of the people is the basis of legitimate government authority in a democratic state.
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In cases of foreign military occupation of a sovereign and independent state, irrespective of the legality or legitimacy (however defined) of the intervention, there is a violation of the right of peoples to self-determination. 82 The self-determination remedy requires the restoration of the previous constitutional order, or, where this is not possible or in accordance with the will of the people, the establishment of a government elected in accordance with the expressed wishes of the population concerned. 83 Security Council resolutions authorizing the administration of territories on behalf of the international community are clear on the need to introduce democratic government. 84 A determination by the Security Council that a representative government should be established in an occupied territory following free and fair elections is consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination. 85 The endorsement of a particular form of democratic government, without the express consent of the people of the territory concerned, is not. 86 There is no paradigmatic model of democracy that may be imposed on territories subject to military occupation. This is particularly the case in territories where political differences between ethno-cultural groups extend beyond questions of culture to encompass all political issues, and political debate is limited to bargaining between political parties claiming to represent the different ethno-cultural groups over the distribution of public goods.
There is no consensus in the theory or practice of democracy as to the appropriate form of government in deeply-divided polities, although it is generally recognized that the application of simply majoritarian conceptions of democracy is problematic. 87 A numbers of writers propose power-sharing between the main ethno-cultural groups;
88 others suggest more integrative approaches to the practice of democracy which encourage political parties to seek support from members of different ethnocultural groups. 
The Conflict between 'Higher' Norms within the International Legal Order
In cases of conflict between resolutions of the Security Council adopted under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and rights and obligations under other sources of international law, it is the position of the Security Council that its resolutions should prevail.
91 Security Council resolutions are binding in respect of UN member states by virtue of articles 25 and 48(1), 92 and by article 2(6) in relation to 'all States'. 93 Resolution adopted under chapter VII constitute, by virtue of article 103 of the UN Charter, 94 a 'higher' form of legal obligation within the system of international law.
In relation to the resolutions endorsing democratic regime change in Iraq, the conflict was between the relevant Security Council resolutions and a 'higher' norm of jus cogens. This conflict may be resolved in one of three ways:
95 the norm of jus cogens may 'trump' the offending provisions of the Security Council resolution;
96 Security Council resolutions, properly adopted, 97 may demand respect even in cases of conflict with norms of jus cogens; or the conflict may be resolved in accordance with principles of constitutional adjudication, 'balancing' the interests of international public order against the right of the Iraqi people to political self-determination. Consideration of the appropriate response to situations of conflict between resolutions adopted under chapter VII and norms of jus cogens is complicated by the fact that there is little scope for 'balancing' the interests of international peace and security against the humanitarian values recognized in the clearly accepted norms of jus cogens: the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture. The exception, beyond that of the peremptory norm concerning the prohibition on the use of force, 99 is the right of peoples to self-determination, beyond colonialism. 100 As Michael Matheson has observed, there may be circumstances where the Security Council is justified in requiring a change in some aspect of the political structure of a state, where it determines that 'doing so is necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security'. 101 The question is whether the right of peoples to political self-determination should be overridden by the 'public interest in the maintenance of international peace and security', 102 the pursuit of which is considered more compelling in the particular circumstances of the case.
Under the Charter, the Members of the United Nations 'confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf'. 103 To adopt a resolution which has the effect of negating the right of peoples to self-determination, the Council must overcome the double veto provided by the Charter scheme:
104 the formal veto accorded to each of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the 'functional veto' accorded to the non-permanent members, who may prevent the adoption of a resolution, which will fail without the requisite nine positive votes. 105 The practice of the Security Council is to act where possible by consensus. 106 Kathleen Cronin-Furman refers to the pronouncements of the Security Council as having 'the quality of having been fairly arrived at through a consensus among nations varying greatly along geographical and political lines'. 107 It is noteworthy that China observed that resolution 1546 (2004) was adopted as a result of 'joint efforts by all Council members, who actively participated in the consultations and searched for consensus in a constructive spirit and with a pragmatic and cooperative approach'. 108 There may then be an argument for absolute deference to the judgement of the Security Council on matters concerning international peace and security. 109 In other words, a resolution properly adopted under chapter VII should be regarded in all instances as a lawful exercise of the political authority vested in the Council under the UN Charter.
The adoption of a resolution by the Security Council in accordance with proper procedure provides presumptive evidence that sufficient justification exists for the introduction of the relevant measures, but this is not conclusive: it does not, ipso facto, create political legitimacy for the resolution or shield it from legal challenge. The subjective judgement of the Security Council cannot avoid the objective fact that it operates within a constitutional system of law provided by the UN Charter. The consent of the Members of the United Nations to submit themselves to the authority of the Security Council on matters of international peace and security through membership of the organization does not absolve the Council from an obligation to provide sufficient justification for the actual exercise of political authority in a particular case. 110 The fact that an issue falls within the scope of its authority does not, in all circumstances, entitle the Security Council to act, or to act in a particular way. The exercise of political authority within any system of law must be justified in the circumstances of the particular case in order to avoid the arbitrary exercise of power: the doctrine of the rule of law.
There is at present no formal process for the direct review of Security Council resolutions within the system of international law.
111 A right of indirect judicial review, in which the position of one or more parties to a dispute is dependent upon the legal status of a Security Council resolution, has been recognized by international Courts
Democratic Legitimacy and Security Council Resolutions
In An agenda for peace, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that '[d]emocracy within the family of nations . . . requires the fullest consultation, participation and engagement of all States, large and small, in the work of the Organization'. Moreover, the principles of the Charter 'must be applied consistently, not selectively'. 114 The international system of law approximates, in its ideal form, to deliberative conceptions of the practice of democracy, 115 in which equal members of a legal community engage in a process of reasoned deliberation with a view to reaching a consensus on the political questions of the day. 116 In diplomatic conversations, states will have their own interests and preferred outcomes. Self-interested or self-regarding arguments will not, however, prevail. 117 States cannot simply impose their views on others. 118 They must seek a 'reasoned consensus', 119 through a process of 'discourse, reasoning and renegotiation'. 120 As Ian Johnstone explains, states must offer 'reasonable arguments . . . those that fit within a wider context of shared understandings about the rules of international life'. 121 According to the Westphalian orthodoxy, the system of public international law is constituted by a complex web of voluntary legal relationships between sovereign and independent states. 122 Ian Brownlie has referred to the sovereignty and equality of states 123 as 'the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations'. One corollary of the principle is the 'dependence of obligations arising under customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor'. 124 Political legitimacy in the international legal order is guaranteed by 'the rational exchange of arguments, which eventually arrives at a conclusion in the form of agreement'. 125 The adoption of the Charter of the United Nations represented a move away from this Westphalian orthodoxy: the Charter not only proclaimed that the rules of the organization were a 'higher' form of law, 126 but also recognized the political authority of a subsidiary body to take enforcement measures on vague and indeterminate grounds, irrespective of the view of the (member) states against which the measures were applied. The authority granted to the Security Council under chapter VII reflected a move away from an essentially contractual understanding of the system of international law 127 to a constitutional one that embraces a form of international regulation, 128 in which the legitimate, and therefore lawful, exercise of political authority is conditioned not by the will of the parties to the international agreement, but by the practice of the institution of government which gives concrete meaning to the open-textured provisions of its constitutive instrument.
Consent is not a necessary condition for the application of laws and regulations in the practice of deliberative democracy. Where, following reasoned democratic deliberation, a majority of participants agree that policy proposal A should be adopted, there is a presumption that the policy is legitimate. 129 The fact of majority support does not ipso facto provide democratic legitimacy for an impugned measure (the fact that the measure is impugned creates problems of democratic legitimacy, requiring justification for its introduction). Laws and regulations are legitimate to the extent that the processes of deliberation and substantive outcomes are consistent with the principles of deliberative democracy. There must be an inclusive process of democratic decision-making, with those who will be subject to the laws and regulations able to participate effectively in the process. In those deliberations, participants must put forward reasons that others may reasonably accept and reject proposals 'on the basis that insufficiently good reasons have been offered for them': the requirement of public reason. 130 There must be a reasoned basis for the introduction of laws and regulations. This is particularly important when the impugned measure will have the effect of interfering with, or negating, the rights of subjects recognized within the 125 The role of constitutional courts in a deliberative system of government is not to supplant the judgement of the members of the democratic polity with their own subjective positions. Their role is to be the 'custodian of deliberative democracy'.
132 Relevant questions for constitutional courts concern the source of authority for an impugned measure; the question of participation by those affected by the measure in the decision-making process; and the justification for the introduction of the measure. Constitutional courts may also evaluate an impugned measure against the constructed conceptions of justice recognized in the political community. 133 The constitutional court must evaluate the reasoned argument for the introduction of an impugned measure on its own terms in the context of the wider system of law. The court must determine whether sufficient justification exists for the negation of the rights of the subjects of the legal system in the interests of the general good in the particular circumstances of the case. Where a political body fails to adduce reasons for a particular decision or regulation, then, to the extent that it does not 'fit' with existing legal norms, principles, and practices, the decision must be regarded as arbitrary and, consequently, not deserving of democratic political legitimacy or legal status.
According to a deliberative understanding of the nature of the system of international law, the democratic legitimacy of Security Council resolutions is dependent upon the extent to which they are consistent with the constitutional framework provided by the Charter of the United Nations and wider international law; 134 that they conform to the requirements of procedural legitimacy; and comply with the requirements of substantive legitimacy, which requires that adopted measures can be justified in accordance with the principles of public reason and equal treatment. External 'moral' positions on international justice, which might, for example, argue for extending the democratic entitlement to the persons and people(s) of Iraq, are not relevant when considering the 'democratic' legitimacy of Security Council resolutions or their legal status. The only relevant standards of justice are those recognized by the international legal community, 135 including the fundamental norm of general international law concerning the right of peoples to self-determination, which provides both a constitutional limit on the exercise of political authority by the Security Council under the Charter, and a consideration of international justice as a norm of jus cogens. 131 Habermas, supra note 98, at 414. 132 Ibid., at 275. 133 Ibid., at 282. 134 by only the United States, 152 and United Kingdom, 153 and only then in the context of a 'federal, democratic, pluralist, and unified Iraq'. Nor does any of the terms enjoy a fixed and uncontested meaning in international law; nor were the resolutions irrelevant to the process of political transition, with the Iraqi representative to the Security Council referring to the mandate provided by resolution 1546 (2004) to draft a new permanent constitution which would 'enshrine the ideas of . . . pluralism, democratic rights, [and] federalism'. 154 There was no articulation in the relevant resolutions or the debates in the Security Council of the rationale for introducing democracy in Iraq, for the process of democratization, or the system of government 'endorsed', reflecting perhaps differences between the occupying powers and other states on the process of political transformation. 155 Security Council resolution 1546 (2004) endorsed a system of 'ethnic power-sharing' and moves towards a highly devolved federal system with limited evidence of support from the Iraqi people, in contravention of their right to political self-determination. According to deliberative concepts of democratic decision-making, regulations enjoy political legitimacy (and putative legality) to the extent that they comply with the requirement of public reason. Resolution 1546 (2004) cannot be defended in accordance with the principle of public reason, as no reasons were provided, creating significant problems for accepting the legitimacy of the resolution, and its claim to give legal recognition, at the level of the international community, to the fact of regime change.
In Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice concluded that all states were under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall, which involved a violation of the right of peoples to self-determination. 156 Similarly, article 41(2) of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides that no state 'shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach' of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law, including the right of peoples to self-determination. 157 The endorsement by the Security Council of the introduction of a form of 'democratic' government that provided for the sharing of power between the three main ethno-cultural groups in Iraq without reasoned justification cannot be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the political authority provided to the Security Council under the Charter, and consequently a lawful exercise of that authority: the resolutions did not remove the proscription on regime change provided by the regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land. However, just as the Hague regulations must be read in the light of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, 158 they must also be read in the light of the emergence of the right of peoples to self-determination. As Eyal Benvenisti has observed, the 'ultimate test for the legality of the regime installed by an occupant is its approval in internally monitored general elections, carried out without undue delay'. 159 The endorsement by the Iraqi people of the new constitution, drafted by elected representatives in the Transitional National Assembly, in the referendum of 15 October 2005 and their participation in elections on 15 December 2005 constituted a legitimate expression of democratic self-determination, giving legal effect to the fact of democratic regime change. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that they were not accorded a free choice in determining the form and functioning of democracy in Iraq, given the existence of a political system imposed by the occupying powers, and endorsed by the Security Council, in the form of the Transitional Administrative Law. 
Conclusion
This article has shown that the endorsement of the particular form of government introduced under the authority of the occupying powers in Iraq constituted a violation of the right of peoples to self-determination. One consequence of the introduction of power-sharing between the representatives of the main ethno-cultural groups has been the establishment of a political system in Iraq in which religious and ethnic identity are central to political debate. 161 The principal concern of this work is not, however, the possibilities or modalities of forcible democratic regime change, but the resolution of the conflict between the measures adopted by the Security Council and the right of peoples to political self-determination, a norm of jus cogens standing. Given that the nature of the system of international law is deliberation, reason, and consensus, the work has argued that the democratic legitimacy of Security Council resolutions is dependent on the extent to which they are consistent with the constitutional framework provided by the UN Charter and wider international law, and that the relevant measures can be justified in accordance with the principle of public reason. The relevant question is whether the negation of the right of the Iraqi people to political self-determination was necessary to restore international peace and security: this is a question of subjective, political judgment.
In a related context, Judge Kooijmans, in his separate opinion in Case concerning oil platforms, argued that the evaluation of issues concerning 'essential security interests . . . is first and foremost a political question and can hardly be replaced by a judicial assessment. Only when the political evaluation is patently unreasonable ... is a judicial ban appropriate'. 162 A political judgement is patently unreasonable where no reasons are provided, or no reasoned justification exists for the introduction of an impugned measure. A regulation introduced without any reasoned justification cannot have the effect of negating the existing rights of the subjects of the legal system: arbitrary regulations (and resolutions) have no legal effect. It follows that the Security Council is obliged to provide a clear, reasoned argument for any resolution that purports to effect a change in the legal rights or obligations of any state or other subject of international law. This is particularly the case where the norm in question is one of jus cogens standing. A requirement that the Council articulate a clear basis for the exercise of the political authority vested in it under the Charter is not only a practical necessity; it is also required if states are not to avoid their obligation to comply with resolutions adopted under chapter VII by engaging in subjective acts of judicial review. Given that the Security Council is increasingly exercising its political authority away from areas clearly accepted and recognized as being concerned with international peace and security, 163 the articulation of public reason is necessary if the Council is not to find its authority increasingly challenged within the international legal community.
